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==History==
==History==
The origins of the PRC propaganda system can be traced to the [[Yan'an Rectification Movement|Yan’an and the rectification movements carried out there]]<ref name="Frederick">{{cite book|last=C. Teiwes|first= Frederick |title=Politics and Purges in China|publisher=Armonk: M. E. Sharpe|date=1993|edition=2nd|chapter=1,2}}</ref>following which it became a key mechanism in the Party's campaigns.<ref name="Solomon">{{cite book|last=Solomon|first=Richard|title=Mao’s Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture|publisher=Berkeley: University of California Press|date=1971}}</ref><ref name="Shambaugh" /> The propaganda system, considered a central part of CCP’s “control system”<ref name="Franz2 ">{{cite book|last=Schurmann’s |first=Franz |title= Ideology and Organization in Communist China|publisher=Berkeley: University of California Press|date=1966}}</ref><ref name="Shambaugh" />, drew much from Soviet, Nazi and other totalitarian states’ propaganda methods<ref name="David">{{cite book|last=Welch|first=David |title=The Third Reich: Politics and Propaganda|publisher=New York: Routledge|date=1993}}</ref><ref name="Shambaugh" />. It represented a quintessential [[agitprop|Leninist “transmission belt” for indoctrination and mass mobilization]]<ref>{{cite book|last=Inkeles|first=Alex|title=Public Opinion in Soviet Russia: A Study in Mass Persuasion |publisher=Cambridge: Harvard University Press|date=1950}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|last=Kenez|first=Peter |title=The Birth of the Propaganda State: Soviet Methods of Mass Mobilization |publisher=Cambridge: Cambridge University Press|date=1985}}</ref>{<ref name="Shambaugh" />.
The origins of the PRC propaganda system can be traced to the [[Yan'an Rectification Movement|Yan’an and the rectification movements carried out there]]<ref name="Frederick">{{cite book|last=C. Teiwes|first= Frederick |title=Politics and Purges in China|publisher=Armonk: M. E. Sharpe|date=1993|edition=2nd|chapter=1,2}}</ref>following which it became a key mechanism in the Party's campaigns.<ref name="Solomon">{{cite book|last=Solomon|first=Richard|title=Mao’s Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture|publisher=Berkeley: University of California Press|date=1971}}</ref><ref name="Shambaugh" /> The propaganda system, considered a central part of CCP’s “control system”<ref name="Franz2 ">{{cite book|last=Schurmann’s |first=Franz |title= Ideology and Organization in Communist China|publisher=Berkeley: University of California Press|date=1966}}</ref><ref name="Shambaugh" />, drew much from Soviet, Nazi and other totalitarian states’ propaganda methods<ref name="David">{{cite book|last=Welch|first=David |title=The Third Reich: Politics and Propaganda|publisher=New York: Routledge|date=1993}}</ref><ref name="Shambaugh" />. It represented a quintessential [[agitprop|Leninist “transmission belt” for indoctrination and mass mobilization]]<ref>{{cite book|last=Inkeles|first=Alex|title=Public Opinion in Soviet Russia: A Study in Mass Persuasion |publisher=Cambridge: Harvard University Press|date=1950}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|last=Kenez|first=Peter |title=The Birth of the Propaganda State: Soviet Methods of Mass Mobilization |publisher=Cambridge: Cambridge University Press|date=1985}}</ref><ref name="Shambaugh">{{cite journal|last=Shambaugh|first=David |title=China's Propaganda System: Institutions, Processes and Efficacy. journal=China Journal, Issue 57; Jan 2007; pp. 25-58}}</ref>.

Propaganda and indoctrination are considered to have been a hallmark of the Maoist state<ref name=Franz2/><ref name="Frederick"/><ref name="Shambaugh" /> and [[Mao]] a “master propagandist” in his own right. His regime employed a variety of “thought control” techniques including incarceration for brainwashing, construction of models to be emulated, mass mobilization campaigns and creation of study groups and ideological monitors throughout society, promulgation of articles to be memorized, control of the educational system, a nationwide system of loudspeakers that reached into every village, control of and propaganda through media, and creation of propaganda teams to indoctrinate segments of the population, among other methods. <ref name="Shambaugh">{{cite journal|last=Shambaugh|first=David |title=China's Propaganda System: Institutions, Processes and Efficacy. journal=China Journal, Issue 57; Jan 2007; pp. 25-58}}</ref>


Propaganda in China during the Maoist era, while ostensibly aspiring to a "Communist utopia," according to Brady, often had a negative focus, with a focus on constantly searching for enemies among the people. The means of persuasion was often extremely violent, Brady says, "a literal acting out of class struggle."<ref name=brady08>p. 70</ref>
Propaganda in China during the Maoist era, while ostensibly aspiring to a "Communist utopia," according to Brady, often had a negative focus, with a focus on constantly searching for enemies among the people. The means of persuasion was often extremely violent, Brady says, "a literal acting out of class struggle."<ref name=brady08>p. 70</ref>

Revision as of 13:44, 19 February 2010

Propaganda in the People's Republic of China refers to the PRC's use of distributing information to the general public, and, according to Rana Mitter, is central to the operation of the Chinese system of government.[1] Aspects of propaganda can be traced back to the earliest period of Chinese history, but propaganda has been most effective in the twentieth century thanks to the mass media and a powerful authoritarian government.[1]

Mao-era China is known for its constant use of mass campaigns to legitimate the state and the policies of leaders. It was the first Chinese government to successfully make use of modern mass propaganda techniques, adapting them to the needs of a country which had a largely rural and illiterate population.[1]

History

The origins of the PRC propaganda system can be traced to the Yan’an and the rectification movements carried out there[2]following which it became a key mechanism in the Party's campaigns.[3][4] The propaganda system, considered a central part of CCP’s “control system”[5][4], drew much from Soviet, Nazi and other totalitarian states’ propaganda methods[6][4]. It represented a quintessential Leninist “transmission belt” for indoctrination and mass mobilization[7][8][4].

Propaganda in China during the Maoist era, while ostensibly aspiring to a "Communist utopia," according to Brady, often had a negative focus, with a focus on constantly searching for enemies among the people. The means of persuasion was often extremely violent, Brady says, "a literal acting out of class struggle."[9]

CCP propaganda and thought work traditionally had a much broader notion of the public sphere than is usually defined by media specialists, according to Brady.[9] Chinese propagandists used every possible means of communication available in China after 1949, including electronic, such as film, radio, television, public address systems; education, including curriculum, scholarly research, and book publising; print media, such as newspapers, cartoon books, wall newspaper, big character posters, pamphlets, slogans on the walls of buildings, etc.; culture, such as entertainment shows, cross-talk, storytelling, politicised art and music; and oral, including literacy classes, memorising Mao quotes, school and mass organisations, one-one-one thought education sessions, and political study classes in the workplace.[9]

China Central Television has traditionally served as a major national conduit for televised propaganda, while the People's Daily newspaper has served as a medium for print propaganda. During the Mao years, a distinctive feature of propaganda and thought work was "rule by editorial," according to Brady. Political campaigns would be launched through editorials and leading articles in People's Daily, which would be followed by other papers.[9] Work units and other organizational political study groups utilized these artilces as a source for political study. During the Mao years, reading newspapers in China was "a political obligation," according to Frederick Yu. Mao used Lenin's model for the media, which had it function as a tool of mass propaganda, agitation, and organization.[9]

A poster during the Criticize Lin Biao, Criticize Confucius campaign. It reads, "The criticism of Lin and Kong (Confucius) is a matter of prime importance to the country and armed forces".

Political scientists believe that propaganda in the PRC is being utilized by the CCP to nurture the development of Chinese nationalism and of loyalty to the PRC, the CCP, and the Beijing government in general. Many also believe that the PRC government, having embarked on a program of capitalist-style economic reform and modernization in the late 1970s, is keen to use propaganda to portray the CCP as a nationalistic and patriotic party, rather than simply as a party that builds socialism or implements Marxism-Leninism in China, since these have largely been abandoned in practice and thus can no longer serve as effective bases for loyalty to the regime. Common themes in the new nationalistic propaganda of the PRC include the lionizing of the CCP's People's Liberation Army and its individual soldiers for their exploits and sacrifices during the 1937-1945 Second Sino-Japanese War and the allegedly seamless unity of the nation's 56 officially recognized ethnic groups.

In previous decades, PRC propaganda was crucial to the formation and promotion of the cult of personality centered around Chairman Mao Zedong. It also served as a useful tool for mobilizing popular participation in national campaigns such as the 1958 Great Leap Forward and the 1966-76 Cultural Revolution. Following the death of Mao in 1976, propaganda was used to blacken the character of the notorious Gang of Four, which was seen as responsible for the excesses of the Cultural Revolution. Past propaganda also encouraged the Chinese people to emulate selfless model workers and soldiers such as the famous Comrade Lei Feng, suicidal Chinese Civil War hero Dong Cunrui, self-sacrificing Korean War hero Yang Gensi, and Dr. Norman Bethune, a Canadian doctor who assisted the Communist Eighth Route Army during the Second Sino-Japanese War. It also praised Third World revolutionaries and close foreign allies such as Albania and North Korea while vilifying both the United States "imperialists" and the Soviet "revisionists" (the latter of whom was seen as having betrayed Marxism-Leninism). One of the most famous propagandist who went sidetracked was Zhang Zhixin. Her loyalty to the party as well as opposition to the ultra-left, singled her out to severe punishment, yet her story provides a good example of how propaganda is delivered.

Propaganda produced by the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China of the ruling CCP has been disseminated through state-controlled print and electronic media, and the CCP has made prolific use of the Internet as a means of distributing propaganda to both Chinese citizens and foreigners in the modern age.

Modernizing the propaganda apparatus

Anne-Marie Brady, an Associate Professor at the University of Canterbury’s School of Political Science and Communication, in her book Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China writes that propaganda and thought work have become the "life blood" of the Party-State since the post-1989 period, and one of the key means for guaranteeing the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) continued legitimacy and hold on power.[9]

In the 1990s propaganda theorists described the challenges to China's propaganda and thought work as "blind spots"; mass communication was advocated as the antidote to them. From the early 1990s, selective concepts from mass communication theory, public relations, advertising, social psychology and other areas of modern mass persuasion were introduced into China's propaganda system, for the purpose of creating modern propaganda model.[9]

Structure and mechanics

David Shambaugh, professor of political science and international affairs at the Elliott School of International Affairs[10] and a fellow of the Brookings Institution[11] writes in an article titled China's Propaganda System: Institutions, Processes and Efficacy published in The China Journal that CCP's propaganda system (xuanchuan xitong), extends itself, as a sprawling bureaucratic establishment, into virtually every medium concerned with the dissemination of information.[4] Shambaugh notes that according to the CCP publication Zhongguo Gongchandang jianshe dazidian[12][4], "newspaper offices, radio stations, television stations, publishing houses, magazines, and other news and media departments; universities, middle schools, primary schools, and other vocational education, specialized education, cadre training, and other educational organs; musical troupes, theatrical troupes, film production studios, film theaters, drama theaters, clubs, and other cultural organs, literature and art troupes, and cultural amusement parks; cultural palaces, libraries, remembrance halls, exhibition halls, museums, and other cultural facilities and commemoration exhibition facilities" come under CCP's propaganda oversight. Shambaugh believes that this expansive definition implies that every conceivable medium which transmits and conveys information to the people of China falls under bureaucratic purview of the the CCP Propaganda Department ( CCPPD)[4]

According to official government reports in 2003, channels of propaganda dissemination of the CCPPD included 2,262 television stations (of which 2,248 were “local”), 2,119 newspapers, 9,074 periodicals and 1,123 publishing houses,[4][13] in addition to internal circulation papers and local gazetteers, approximately 68 million internet accounts with more than 100 million users, and more than 300 million mobile phone users who fall under the system's purview.[14]

Shambaugh states that the writ of the CCPPD has remained unchanged since the Maoist era, while the mechanics of oversight and active censorship have undergone considerable evolution.[4]

Propaganda work by the CCP has been, historically, divided into two categories: directed towards Chinese people (internal or duinei) and directed towards foreigners and the outside world (external or duiwai) as well as four types: political, economic, cultural and social. [15]The Central Propaganda Department oversees internal propaganda, and the the Office of Foreign Propaganda matters relating to external propaganda.[15] The central propaganda department is a highly secretive office with its address and contact details classified, and it is only indirectly represented online. The propaganda system, including the Central Propaganda Department, does not appear in officially published diagrams of the Chinese Bureaucratic System, whether in Chinese or in other languages.[15]

Spin doctors

According to Anne-Marie Brady, the Foreign Ministry first set up a system of designated officials to give information in times of crisis in 1983, and greatly expanded the system to lower levels in the mid 1990s. Previously, China's spin had been directed only at foreigners, but in the 1990s leaders realised that managing public crises was useful for domestic politics; this included setting up provincial level "News Coordinator Groups," and inviting foreign PR firms to give seminars.[9]

Brady claims that Chinese foreign propaganda officials took cues from the Blair government's spin doctoring during the "mad cow" disease crisis of 2000-2001, and the Bush government's use of the U.S. media after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. According to her, the Blair model allows for a certain amount of negative coverage to be shown during a crisis, which is believed to help release some of the "social tension" surrounding it. She believes information managers in China used this approach during coal mining disasters of 2005.[9]

Brady further claims that trained official spokespeople are now available on call in every central government ministry, as well as in local governments, to deal with emerging crises. These spin doctors are coordinated and trained by the Office of Foreign Propaganda/State Council Information Office.[9]

Propaganda on the Internet

In later years the Internet has played a key role for the CCP to spread propaganda to the Chinese diaspora. PRC-based Internet sites are a leading source of Chinese language and China-related news for overseas Chinese. The Internet is an extremely effective tool for guiding and organizing overseas Chinese public opinion, according to Anne-Marie Brady. She cites an example of the role of the Internet in organizing popular protests by overseas Chinese in 2008 against the perceived bias of the Western media in its coverage of unrest in Tibetan areas in March 2008 and, a month later, in organizing a series of worldwide demonstrations in support of China during the Olympic torch relay.

"These protests and the later demonstrations were genuine and popular, which shows the effectiveness of China’s efforts to rebuild positive public opinion within the Chinese diaspora, but it should be noted that they received official support, both symbolic and practical."[16]There was no compulsion for overseas Chinese not to attend the rallies, but those who did were given free t-shirts, souvenirs, transport, and in some cases accommodation, all courtesy of local embassy officials and China-based donors. These demonstrations successfully drowned out the protests of human rights groups.

A significant effort has been made to police the internet with an estimated 30,000 human monitors and a variety of sophisticated technological filters and devices.[4][17]

Traditionally, the CCP propaganda apparatus had been based around suppressing news and information, but this often meant the Party found itself in a reactive posture, according to Chinese media expert David Bandurski.[18]

Internet spin doctors

Main article: 50 Cent Party

David Bandurski in an article published in the Far Eastern Economic Review claimed that China is known for using internet "spin doctors", specially trained internet users who comment on blogs, public forums or wikis, to shift the debate in favor of the Communist Party and influence public opinion.[19] According to an article published in the BBC News Online by BBC correspondent Michael Bristow, they are sometime called the "50-cent party" (named so because they are allegedly paid 50 Chinese cents for each comment supporting the CCP they make).[20]

Bristow claimed that government documents, such as, an internal document produced by Nanning city authority, Guangxi province, outline the requirements for those employed as spin-doctors, which include having "relatively good political and professional qualities, and have a pioneering and enterprising spirit", being able to react quickly, etc.[20]

According to Bristow, it is believed that such government-sponsored Internet commentators have now become widespread and their numbers could be in the tens of thousands;[20] Bandurski suggests the number may be up to 280, 000.[18] Bristow reports that special centres have been set up to train China's 'army of internet spin doctors'. [20]

Ideological background

In the realm of the arts, the theory of socialist realism that was adopted by the USSR and the PRC of Mao Zedong explicitly states as its goal the education of the people in the objectives and the meaning of the ideology of communism. One of the official goals of the 1966-76 Cultural Revolution in the PRC was "to transform literature and art."

The CCP Central Propaganda Department, together with state organizations like the General Administration of Press and Publication, the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television, and the State Council Information Office, oversee all printing for consistency with official political doctrines under detailed regulations, such as the "Regulations Regarding Strengthening the Administration of Publications Describing Major Party and National Leaders" (1990), which states in part:

The publication and distribution of these types of books and essays must be solemn and discreet. The description of historical facts must be accurate, and the point of view must conform with the spirit of the Party's "Decision Regarding Certain Historical Problems," "Decision Regarding Certain Historical Problems Since the Establishment of the Party" and related Party documents. All responsible agencies and publishing units must strictly guard against violations, and anything that does not conform to the above mentioned requirements may not be published and distributed.

Thought reform

Propaganda and thought work in the Maoist era had a number of distinctive features, according to Brady, such as "ideological remolding" or "thought reform" (思想改造), ideological purges, ritual humiliation of ideological enemies, an emphasis on political study to raise levels of awareness of the current line, and targeting high-profile individuals as symbols of negative tendencies which must be eradicated.[9]

Biderman and Meyers write that while some kind of thought reform is a characteristic aim of all totalitarian regimes, the CCP "set about it more purposefully, more massively, and more intensively than have other ruling groups," including applying known techniques in new ways. An example given is in daily meetings for self and mutual criticism during the 60s, surveillance and overt sanctions were tied in with education to "expose, censure, and correct shortcomings of attitude and conduct." At the same time, Communist leaders attacked all personal connections between soldiers that were not based on political convictions. "By these and other techniques they exploit social pressures and personal anxieties brilliantly to ensure conformity," they write.[21]

Famous propaganda works

Films

Songs

Propaganda songs and music have a long and storied history in the PRC and also in Nepal and Pakistan, and they figured prominently in the popular culture of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. Many of these songs were collected and performed as modern rock adaptations for several albums that were released during the 1990s, including "Red Rock" and "Red Sun: Mao Zedong Praise Songs New Revolutionary Medley". The latter sold 6-10 million copies in China (see the external link on "Rethinking Cultural Revolution Culture"). Most of the older songs praise Mao, the CCP, the 1949 revolution, the Chinese Red Army and the People's Liberation Army, the unity of the ethnic groups of China, and the various ethnic groups' devotion to Mao and the CCP.

The titles of some of the more well-known propaganda songs are as follows:

  • "Nanniwan" (a 1943 revolutionary song)
  • "The East is Red" (the de facto national anthem of the PRC during the Cultural Revolution)
  • "Socialism is Good", a modern rock adaptation of which was performed by Zhang Qu and featured on the 1990s album Red Rock.
  • "Song of the People's Liberation Army" (中国解放軍军歌)–
  • "Battle Hymn of the Chinese People's Volunteers" (中国人民志愿军战歌)–a well-known song from the Korean War period
  • "Red Sun Shining Over the Border" (紅太陽照邊疆)–a song from the Yanbian in Jilin
  • "A Wa People Sing New Songs" (阿佤唱新歌曲)–a song attributed to the Wa ethnic minority of Yunnan
  • "Laundry Song" (洗衣歌)–a song celebrating the liberation of Tibet
  • "Liuyang River" (浏阳河)–a song about a river near Mao Zedong's hometown of Shaoshan in Hunan
  • "Saliha Most Obeys Chairman Mao" (薩利哈最聽毛主席的話)–a song attributed to the Kazakh minority of the Xinjiang
  • "The Never-Setting Sun Rises Over the Grassland" (草原上升起不落的太陽–from Inner Mongolia
  • "Xinjiang is Good" (新疆好)–attributed to the ethnic Uyghurs of Xinjiang
  • "I Love Beijing Tiananmen" (我爱北京天安门)–claimed to have been translated into over 50 languages, this song is frequently taught to schoolchildren in the PRC
  • "Zhuang Brocade Dedicated to Chairman Mao" (莊錦獻給毛主席)–a song attributed to the Zhuang ethnic minority of the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region
  • "Sweet-Scented Osmanthus Blooms With the Arrival of Happiness" (attributed to the Miao, or Chinese Hmong, ethnic minority group)
  • "Generations Remember Chairman Mao's Kindness" (a song celebrating the "liberation" of the ethnic Xibe people)
  • "Salaam Chairman Mao" (薩拉姆毛主席)–a Xinjiang song praising Mao, a modern version of which was performed by Chinese rock singer Dao Lang
  • "Song of Mount Erlangshan" (歌唱二郎山)–a 1950s song celebrating the development of Tibet, which made Mount Erlangshan in western Sichuan famous
  • "Story of the Spring" (春天的故事)–a song performed by Dong Wenhua, initially at the 1997 CCTV New Year's Gala, days before his death, dedicated to late Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping
  • "The Cultural Revolution is Just Great" (无产阶级文化大革命就是好)–a song praising the Cultural Revolution
  • "On the Golden Mountains of Beijing" (北京的金山上)–a song attributed to the Tibetan people praising Mao as the shining sun
  • "Sing a Song of Praise to the Motherland" (歌唱祖国)–This general patriotic song continues to be sung at national and regional celebrations and galas.

Most of the songs listed above are no longer used as propaganda by the CCP, but are exhibited in mainland China as a means of reviving popular nostalgia for the "old times" and sentiments of nationalism.

See also

References

Bibliography

  • Min, Anchee, Duo, Duo, Landsberger, Stefan R., Chinese Propaganda Posters, 245 x 370 mm, 320 pp., ISBN 3-8228-2619-7 (softcover)
  • Wolf, Michael Chinese Propaganda Posters: From the Collection of Michael Wolf, 2003, ISBN 3-8228-2619-7
  • Harriet Evans, Stephanie Donald (eds.), Picturing Power in the People's Republic of China, ISBN 0-8476-9511-5
  • Stefan Landsberger, Chinese Propaganda Posters: From Revolution to Reform, ISBN 90-5496-009-4
  • Hunter, Edward. Brain-washing in Red China: the calculated destruction of men's minds. New York, N.Y., USA.: Vanguard Press, 1951, 1953,
  • Lincoln Cushing and Ann Tompkins, Chinese Posters: Art from the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, San Francisco, CA : Chronicle Books, 2007, ISBN 978-0-8118-5946-2

Footnotes

  1. ^ a b c Mitter, Rana (2003). Nicholas J. Cull, David Colbert, and David Welch (ed.). Entry on "China" in Propaganda and Mass Persuasion: A Historical Encyclopedia, 1500 to the Present. ABC-ClIO. pp. 73–77.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: editors list (link)
  2. ^ C. Teiwes, Frederick (1993). "1,2". Politics and Purges in China (2nd ed.). Armonk: M. E. Sharpe.
  3. ^ Solomon, Richard (1971). Mao’s Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture. Berkeley: University of California Press.
  4. ^ a b c d e f g h i j Shambaugh, David. "China's Propaganda System: Institutions, Processes and Efficacy. journal=China Journal, Issue 57; Jan 2007; pp. 25-58". {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help); Missing pipe in: |title= (help)
  5. ^ Schurmann’s, Franz (1966). Ideology and Organization in Communist China. Berkeley: University of California Press.
  6. ^ Welch, David (1993). The Third Reich: Politics and Propaganda. New York: Routledge.
  7. ^ Inkeles, Alex (1950). Public Opinion in Soviet Russia: A Study in Mass Persuasion. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
  8. ^ Kenez, Peter (1985). The Birth of the Propaganda State: Soviet Methods of Mass Mobilization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  9. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k p. 70 Cite error: The named reference "brady08" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
  10. ^ David Shambaugh Elliott School of International Affairs
  11. ^ David Shambaugh Brookings Institution
  12. ^ Zhongguo Gongchandang jianshe dazidian 1921–1991 (An Encyclopedia on the Building of the CCP). Chengdu: Sichuan Renmin Chubanshe, 1992. pp. . 676.
  13. ^ National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook 2004. Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2004. pp. 844–46, 853.
  14. ^ Qiang, Xiao (14 April 2005). ""Prepared Statement" for hearings on "China's State Control Mechanisms and Methods", convened by the US–China Economic and Security Review Commission": 83. {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
  15. ^ a b c Brady, Anne-Marie. "Guiding Hand: The Role of the CCP Central Propaganda Department in the Current Era". {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
  16. ^ Anne-Marie Brady, China’s Propaganda and Perception Management Efforts, Its Intelligence Activities that Target the United States, and the Resulting Impacts on U.S. National Security, U.S.-China Economic & Security Review Commission, April 30, 2009
  17. ^ Palfrey, John G. "Jr., Executive Director of Berkman Center for Internet and Society, "Prepared Statement" and testimony, US–China Economic and Security Review Commission". Harvard Law School. {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
  18. ^ a b Bandurski, David. "China's Guerrilla War for the Web," Far Eastern Economic Review, July2008
  19. ^ http://www.feer.com/essays/2008/august/chinas-guerrilla-war-for-the-web
  20. ^ a b c d Bristow, Michael. "China's internet 'spin doctors'". BBC NEWS. Retrieved 11 February 2010.
  21. ^ Meyers, Samuel M. and Albert D Biderman. Mass behaviour in battle and captivity: The communist soldier in the Korean war. (1968), Chicago University Press. p.99

External links

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