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|type = [[501(c)(4) organization|501(c)(4)]], [[charitable organization]]
|type = [[501(c)(4) organization|501(c)(4)]], [[charitable organization]]
|headquarters = [[Austin, Texas]]
|headquarters = [[Austin, Texas]]
|leader_name = Brad Jones<ref>{{Cite web|last=Choi|first=Hojun|title=ERCOT names interim president and CEO following board resignations, Texas freeze response|url=https://www.statesman.com/story/news/2021/04/27/ercot-names-interim-president-ceo-of-texas-largest-grid-operator/4860920001/|access-date=2021-06-15|website=Austin American-Statesman|language=en-US}}</ref>
|leader_name = Pablo Vegas<ref>{{cite news |last1=Ferman |first1=Mitchell |title=Pablo Vegas, a utility executive in Ohio, named ERCOT's new CEO |url=https://www.texastribune.org/2022/08/16/texas-ercot-ceo-pablo-vegas-power-grid/ |access-date=1 December 2022 |work=The Texas Tribune |date=16 August 2022 |language=en}}</ref>
|leader_title = Chief Executive Officer
|leader_title = Chief Executive Officer
|leader_name2 = [[Paul L. Foster]]
|leader_name2 = [[Bill Flores]] (interim)
|leader_title2 = [[Chairperson|Chair]], [[Board of Directors]]
|leader_title2 = [[Chairperson|Chair]], [[Board of Directors]]
|leader_name3 = [[Bill Flores]]
|leader_name3 = [[Bill Flores]]
|leader_title3 = Vice Chair, Board of Directors
|leader_title3 = Vice Chair, Board of Directors
|tax_id = 74-2587416<ref name="Nonprofit Explorer: ELECTRIC RELIABILITY COUNCIL OF TEXAS">{{Cite web |date=2021-02-23 |title=Electric Reliability Council Of Texas Inc 10 10 90 - Nonprofit Explorer |url=https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/742587416 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210224034942/https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/742587416 |archive-date=2021-02-23 |access-date=2021-02-24 |website=ProPublica |language=en}}</ref>
|tax_id = 74-2587416<ref name="Nonprofit Explorer: ELECTRIC RELIABILITY COUNCIL OF TEXAS">{{Cite web |date=2021-02-23 |title=Electric Reliability Council Of Texas Inc 10 10 90 - Nonprofit Explorer |url=https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/742587416 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210224034942/https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/742587416 |archive-date=2021-02-24 |access-date=2021-02-24 |website=ProPublica |language=en}}</ref>
|website = {{URL|http://www.ercot.com/|ercot.com}}
|website = {{URL|http://www.ercot.com/|ercot.com}}
}}
}}
[[File:Rto_map.gif|thumb|300x300px|ISOs and RTOs of North America as of 18 March 2021]]
The '''Electric Reliability Council of Texas, Inc.''' ('''ERCOT''') is an American organization that operates [[Texas]]'s [[electrical grid]], the [[Texas Interconnection]],<ref>{{Cite Q|Q114357264|access-date=2022-10-02}}</ref><ref name="ERCOT-County-Map">{{cite web |title=2019 ERCOT County Map |url=http://www.ercot.com/content/wcm/landing_pages/89373/sized-county-map-6.27.19.jpg |publisher=ERCOT |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190630212458/http://www.ercot.com/content/wcm/landing_pages/89373/sized-county-map-6.27.19.jpg |archive-date=June 30, 2019 |date=June 27, 2019 |url-status=live}}</ref> which supplies power to more than 25 million Texas customers and represents 90 percent of the state's electric load.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.ercot.com/content/wcm/lists/144926/ERCOT_Quick_Facts_8818.pdf|title=Quick facts |date=818 |website=www.ercot.com }}</ref> ERCOT is the first [[Regional transmission organization|independent system operator]] (ISO) in the United States<ref name="auto">{{cite web|url=http://www.ercot.com/about/profile/history/ |title=History of ERCOT |publisher=Ercot.com |access-date=2018-08-14}}</ref> and one of nine ISOs in North America.<ref>ISO/RTO Council homepage, http://www.isorto.org/site/c.jhKQIZPBImE/b.2603295/k.BEAD/Home.htm {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121227114834/http://www.isorto.org/site/c.jhKQIZPBImE/b.2603295/k.BEAD/Home.htm |date=2012-12-27 }}</ref> ERCOT works with the [[Texas Reliability Entity]] (TRE),<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://www.texasre.org/about/Pages/Default.aspx |title=Texas Reliability Entity - About Us |access-date=2013-04-22 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130328213848/http://www.texasre.org/about/Pages/Default.aspx |archive-date=2013-03-28 |url-status=dead }}</ref> one of eight regional entities within the [[North American Electric Reliability Corporation]] (NERC) that coordinate to improve reliability of the bulk power grid.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.nerc.com/page.php?cid=1%7C9%7C119|title=NERC|website=www.nerc.com}}</ref>
The '''Electric Reliability Council of Texas, Inc.''' ('''ERCOT''') is an American organization that operates [[Texas]]'s [[electrical grid]], the [[Texas Interconnection]],<ref>{{Cite Q|Q114357264|access-date=2022-10-02}}</ref><ref name="ERCOT-County-Map">{{cite web |title=2019 ERCOT County Map |url=http://www.ercot.com/content/wcm/landing_pages/89373/sized-county-map-6.27.19.jpg |publisher=ERCOT |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190630212458/http://www.ercot.com/content/wcm/landing_pages/89373/sized-county-map-6.27.19.jpg |archive-date=June 30, 2019 |date=June 27, 2019 |url-status=live}}</ref> which supplies power to more than 25 million Texas customers and represents 90 percent of the state's electric load.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.ercot.com/content/wcm/lists/144926/ERCOT_Quick_Facts_8818.pdf |title=Quick facts |date=818 |website=www.ercot.com |access-date=2018-09-12 |archive-date=2021-02-17 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210217031415/http://www.ercot.com/content/wcm/lists/144926/ERCOT_Quick_Facts_8818.pdf |url-status=dead }}</ref> ERCOT is the first [[Regional transmission organization|independent system operator]] (ISO) in the United States.<ref name="auto">{{cite web|url=http://www.ercot.com/about/profile/history/ |title=History of ERCOT |publisher=Ercot.com |access-date=2018-08-14}}</ref> ERCOT works with the [[Texas Reliability Entity]] (TRE),<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://www.texasre.org/about/Pages/Default.aspx |title=Texas Reliability Entity - About Us |access-date=2013-04-22 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130328213848/http://www.texasre.org/about/Pages/Default.aspx |archive-date=2013-03-28 |url-status=dead }}</ref> one of six regional entities within the [[North American Electric Reliability Corporation]] (NERC) that coordinate to improve reliability of the bulk power grid.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.nerc.com/page.php?cid=1%7C9%7C119|title=NERC|website=www.nerc.com|access-date=2018-08-14|archive-date=2013-04-26|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130426233031/http://www.nerc.com/page.php?cid=1%7C9%7C119|url-status=dead}}</ref>


As the ISO for the region, ERCOT dispatches power on an electric grid that connects more than 46,500 miles of transmission lines and more than 610 generation units.<ref name="ercot.com">{{cite web|url=http://www.ercot.com/content/wcm/lists/144926/ERCOT_Quick_Facts_8818.pdf |title=Quick facts |website=www.ercot.com }}</ref>
As the ISO for the region, ERCOT dispatches power on an electric grid that connects more than 46,500 miles of transmission lines and more than 610 generation units.<ref name="ercot.com">{{cite web |url=http://www.ercot.com/content/wcm/lists/144926/ERCOT_Quick_Facts_8818.pdf |title=Quick facts |website=www.ercot.com |access-date=2018-09-12 |archive-date=2021-02-17 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210217031415/http://www.ercot.com/content/wcm/lists/144926/ERCOT_Quick_Facts_8818.pdf |url-status=dead }}</ref> ERCOT also performs financial settlements for the competitive wholesale bulk-power market and administers retail switching for 7 million premises in competitive choice areas.<ref name="ercot.com"/>


According to an ERCOT report, the major sources of generating capacity in Texas are natural gas (51%), wind (24.8%), coal (13.4%), nuclear (4.9%), solar (3.8%), and hydroelectric or biomass-fired units (1.9%).<ref>Nate Chute, [https://www.statesman.com/story/news/2021/02/17/texas-energy-wind-power-outage-natural-gas-renewable-green-new-deal/6780546002/ What percentage of Texas energy is renewable? Breaking down the state's power sources from gas to wind.], ''Austin American-Statesman'' (February 19, 2021).</ref>
The United States [[Energy Information Administration]] Electric Power Monthly published the following detailed report regarding Texas's Net Generation by Energy Source: Total (All Sectors), 2010-December 2020, (Thousand Megawatthours), Table 1.1, for the Month of December 2020:<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/epm_table_grapher.php?t=table_1_01|title = Electric Power Monthly - U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA)}}</ref>
Coal: 78,700 MWh;
Petroleum Liquids: 909 MWh;
Petroleum Coke: 742 MWh;
Natural Gas: 125,704 MWh;
Other Gas: 972 MWh;
Nuclear: 69,871 MWh;
Hydroelectric Conventional: 23,086 MWh;
Solar: 5,381 MWh;
Renewable Sources Excluding Hydroelectric and Solar: 38,812 MWh;
Hydroelectric Pumped Storage: -368;
Other: 1,160 MWh.
According to an ERCOT report, the major sources of generating capacity in Texas are natural gas (51%), wind (24.8%), coal (13.4%), nuclear (4.9%), solar (3.8%), and hydroelectric or biomass-fired units (1.9%).<ref>Nate Chute, [https://www.statesman.com/story/news/2021/02/17/texas-energy-wind-power-outage-natural-gas-renewable-green-new-deal/6780546002/ What percentage of Texas energy is renewable? Breaking down the state's power sources from gas to wind.], ''Austin American-Statesman'' (February 19, 2021).</ref> ERCOT also performs financial settlements for the competitive wholesale bulk-power market and administers retail switching for 7 million premises in competitive choice areas.<ref name="ercot.com"/>


ERCOT is a membership-based [[501(c)(4)]] nonprofit corporation,<ref name="ERCOT-About"/><ref>{{Cite web|last=Chute|first=Nate|title=Is ERCOT a government agency? Answers to 5 questions about the group that operates Texas' power grid.|url=https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2021/02/19/ercot-texas-power-grid-outage-board-bill-magness-greg-abbott-public-utility-commision-energy/4515522001/|access-date=2021-02-21|website=USA TODAY|language=en-US}}</ref> and its members include consumers, electric cooperatives, generators, power marketers, retail electric providers, investor-owned electric utilities (transmission and distribution providers), and municipally owned electric utilities.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.ercot.com/about/governance/members/|title=Membership|website=www.ercot.com}}</ref>
ERCOT is a membership-based [[501(c)(4)]] nonprofit corporation,<ref name="ERCOT-About"/><ref>{{Cite web|last=Chute|first=Nate|title=Is ERCOT a government agency? Answers to 5 questions about the group that operates Texas' power grid.|url=https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2021/02/19/ercot-texas-power-grid-outage-board-bill-magness-greg-abbott-public-utility-commision-energy/4515522001/ |access-date=2021-02-21|website=USA TODAY|language=en-US}}</ref> and its members include consumers, electric cooperatives, generators, power marketers, retail electric providers, investor-owned electric utilities (transmission and distribution providers), and municipally owned electric utilities.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.ercot.com/about/governance/members/ |title=Membership|website=www.ercot.com}}</ref>


Power demand in the ERCOT region is typically highest in summer, primarily due to air conditioning use in homes and businesses. The ERCOT region's all-time record peak hour occurred on July 8, 2022, when consumer demand hit 78,204 MW.<ref>{{cite web |title=ERCOT breaks another power record, tracker shows |date=10 July 2022 |url=https://www.kxan.com/weather/ercot-breaks-another-power-record-tracker-shows/}}</ref> A megawatt of electricity can power about 200 Texas homes during periods of peak demand.<ref>{{cite web | title=ERCOT Expects Record Electricity Demand for Summer Heat But Projects Sufficient Generation for Power Grid |url=https://thetexan.news/ercot-expects-record-electricity-demand-for-summer-heat-but-projects-sufficient-generation-for-power-grid/ |last=Johnson |first=Brad |website=The Texan |date=16 May 2022}}</ref>
Power demand in the ERCOT region is typically highest in summer, primarily due to air conditioning use in homes and businesses. The ERCOT region's all-time record peak hour occurred on August 10, 2023, when consumer demand hit 85,508 MW.<ref>{{cite web |date=Nov 13, 2023 |title=2023 Peak Demand Records |url=https://www.ercot.com/static-assets/data/news/Content/a-peak-demand/2023/all-time-records.htm |website=ERCOT}}</ref> A megawatt of electricity can power about 200 Texas homes during periods of peak demand.<ref>{{cite web | title=ERCOT Expects Record Electricity Demand for Summer Heat But Projects Sufficient Generation for Power Grid |url=https://thetexan.news/ercot-expects-record-electricity-demand-for-summer-heat-but-projects-sufficient-generation-for-power-grid/ |last=Johnson |first=Brad |website=The Texan |date=16 May 2022}}</ref> By 2022, ERCOT had 2 GW of [[Battery storage power station|grid batteries]], with another 6 GW underway.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Murray |first1=Cameron |title=Is the ERCOT battery storage market going to saturate next year? |url=https://www.energy-storage.news/is-the-ercot-battery-storage-market-going-to-saturate-next-year/ |website=Energy Storage News |date=18 April 2023}}</ref>

Bill Magness, CEO of ERCOT, was fired on March 4, 2021, for his role in the [[2021 Texas power crisis|2021 power loss incident]].<ref>[https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2021/03/04/ercot-ceo-bill-magness-terminated-power-outages-texas/6917885002/ USA Today, March 4, 2021]</ref> The board delivered a 60-day termination notice to Magness, who had been president and CEO since 2016. The board said he would serve in those roles for the next two months.<ref>The Wall Street Journal, "Texas Power Grid Operator Fires CEO," March 4, 2021 [https://www.wsj.com/articles/texas-power-grid-operator-fires-ceo-11614834450?mod=hp_lead_pos12]</ref>


==History==
==History==
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Recognizing the reliability advantages of remaining interconnected, TIS members continued to operate and develop the interconnected grid. TIS members adopted official operating guides for their interconnected power system and established two monitoring centers within the control centers of two utilities, one in North Texas and one in South Texas.
Recognizing the reliability advantages of remaining interconnected, TIS members continued to operate and develop the interconnected grid. TIS members adopted official operating guides for their interconnected power system and established two monitoring centers within the control centers of two utilities, one in North Texas and one in South Texas.


In 1970, ERCOT was formed to comply with NERC requirements. However, the Texas grid is not subject to federal regulation, being an intrastate grid without interstate power flows. On May 4, 1976, Central Southwest Holdings attempted to force the issue, with an event that was later called the "Midnight Connection", where it connected the grid to Oklahoma for a few hours. This caused lawsuits about whether federal regulation then applied, however the judgement was that this was not sufficient.<ref name=fleisher>{{Cite web |url=http://www.tjogel.org/archive/Vol3No1/Fleisher.pdf |title=Archived copy |access-date=2021-02-19 |archive-date=2021-02-16 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210216160817/http://tjogel.org/archive/Vol3No1/Fleisher.pdf |url-status=dead }}</ref>
In 1970, ERCOT was formed to comply with NERC requirements. However, the Texas grid is not subject to regulation under the [[Federal Power Act]], being an intrastate grid for the purposes of that law. On May 4, 1976, Central Southwest Holdings attempted to force the issue, with an event that was later called the "Midnight Connection", where it connected the grid to Oklahoma for a few hours. This caused lawsuits about whether federal regulation then applied, however the judgement was that this was not sufficient.<ref name=fleisher>{{Cite web |url=http://www.tjogel.org/archive/Vol3No1/Fleisher.pdf |title=ERCOT's Jurisdictional Status: A Legal History and Contemporary Appraisal |access-date=2021-02-19 |archive-date=2021-02-16 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210216160817/http://tjogel.org/archive/Vol3No1/Fleisher.pdf |url-status=dead }}</ref>


The [[deregulation of the Texas electricity market]] occurred in two phases: the wholesale generation market in 1995 and the rest of the sector in 1999.<ref name=Baddour>Dylan Baddour, [https://www.houstonchronicle.com/local/explainer/article/texas-electric-deregulation-ERCOT-TCAP-7971360.php Texas' deregulated electricity market, explained], ''Houston Chronicle'' (June 8, 2016).</ref> The 1999 deregulation was aimed at counteracting a shortage of generation capacity in the state.<ref>Bruce Hight, [https://www.texasmonthly.com/politics/electric-deregulation-working-texas-says-lawmaker-led-effort/ Electric Deregulation Is Working in Texas, Says Lawmaker Who Led the Effort], ''Texas Monthly'' (August 6, 2018).</ref> Since deregulation, retail providers and power generators were unregulated, although regulations on transmitters continued to control the placement of electrical lines. The legislation abolished the former system, in which power was both generated and consumed locally.<ref name=Baddour/> Instead, under the deregulated regime, retailers could contract with providers across the state, creating a complex market.<ref name=Baddour/> The 1999 deregulation also dropped limits on rate increases. Prior to deregulation, residential electricity rates were significantly below the national average; after deregulation, residential electricity rates increased, rising 64% between 1999 and 2007.<ref name=RootRates>Jay Root, [https://www.nbcdfw.com/news/local/since-deregulation-texas-utility-rates-have-soared/2117017/ Since Deregulation, Texas Utility Rates Have Soared], KXAS-TV (February 9, 2009).</ref>
The [[deregulation of the Texas electricity market]] occurred in two phases: the wholesale generation market in 1995 and the rest of the sector in 1999.<ref name=Baddour>Dylan Baddour, [https://www.houstonchronicle.com/local/explainer/article/texas-electric-deregulation-ERCOT-TCAP-7971360.php Texas' deregulated electricity market, explained], ''Houston Chronicle'' (June 8, 2016).</ref> The 1999 deregulation was aimed at counteracting a shortage of generation capacity in the state.<ref>Bruce Hight, [https://www.texasmonthly.com/politics/electric-deregulation-working-texas-says-lawmaker-led-effort/ Electric Deregulation Is Working in Texas, Says Lawmaker Who Led the Effort], ''Texas Monthly'' (August 6, 2018).</ref> Since deregulation, retail providers and power generators were unregulated, although regulations on transmitters continued to control the placement of electrical lines. The legislation abolished the former system, in which power was both generated and consumed locally.<ref name=Baddour/> Instead, under the deregulated regime, retailers could contract with providers across the state, creating a complex market.<ref name=Baddour/> The 1999 deregulation also dropped limits on rate increases. Prior to deregulation, residential electricity rates were significantly below the national average; after deregulation, residential electricity rates increased, rising 64% between 1999 and 2007.<ref name=RootRates>Jay Root, [https://www.nbcdfw.com/news/local/since-deregulation-texas-utility-rates-have-soared/2117017/ Since Deregulation, Texas Utility Rates Have Soared], KXAS-TV (February 9, 2009).</ref>
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{{See also|February 13–17, 2021 North American winter storm|2021 Texas power crisis}}
{{See also|February 13–17, 2021 North American winter storm|2021 Texas power crisis}}


[[File:Natural gas prices.webp|thumb|420px|right|Natural gas prices spiked to $23.86 on February 17, 2021<ref>{{Cite web | url=https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/rngwhhdd.htm | title=Henry Hub Natural Gas Spot Price (Dollars per Million Btu) }}</ref> <br /> In February 2003 there was a similar spike in natural gas prices because of shortages<ref>https://www.ferc.gov/sites/default/files/2020-05/The-Price-Spike-Report-07-23-03.pdf {{Bare URL PDF|date=March 2022}}</ref>]]
[[File:Natural gas prices.webp|thumb|420px|right|Natural gas prices spiked to $23.86 on February 17, 2021<ref>{{Cite web | url=https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/rngwhhdd.htm | title=Henry Hub Natural Gas Spot Price (Dollars per Million Btu) }}</ref> <br /> In February 2003 there was a similar spike in natural gas prices because of shortages<ref>{{Cite web |date=23 July 2003 |title=The Price Spike Report issued July 23, 2003 |url=https://www.ferc.gov/sites/default/files/2020-05/The-Price-Spike-Report-07-23-03.pdf |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221117144817/https://www.ferc.gov/sites/default/files/2020-05/The-Price-Spike-Report-07-23-03.pdf |archive-date=17 November 2022 |access-date=24 February 2023 |website=Federal Energy Regulatory Commission |format=PDF}}</ref>]]


[[File:ERCOT generation 2021 power crisis US Energy Information Administration.jpg|thumb|upright=1.9|Reduced electricity from coal, nuclear, and wind power plants contributed to the shortage on February 15 and afterwards.<ref name="us-energy-admin">{{Cite web |date=February 18, 2021 |title=Extreme winter weather is disrupting energy supply and demand, particularly in Texas |url=https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=46836 |url-status=live |access-date=March 2, 2021 |website=[[U.S. Energy Information Administration]]|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210219130518/https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=46836 |archive-date=February 19, 2021 }}</ref>]]
[[File:ERCOT generation 2021 power crisis US Energy Information Administration.jpg|thumb|upright=1.9|Reduced electricity from coal, nuclear, and wind power plants contributed to the shortage on February 15 and afterwards.<ref name="us-energy-admin">{{Cite web |date=February 18, 2021 |title=Extreme winter weather is disrupting energy supply and demand, particularly in Texas |url=https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=46836 |url-status=live |access-date=March 2, 2021 |website=[[U.S. Energy Information Administration]]|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210219130518/https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=46836 |archive-date=February 19, 2021 }}</ref>]]
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{{legend|#5E5E5E|[[Coal-fired power station|Coal power]]}}
{{legend|#5E5E5E|[[Coal-fired power station|Coal power]]}}
]]
]]
During a major cold-weather event in mid-February 2021, ERCOT declared a statewide emergency, due to a 34,000 MW shortfall in generation that caused widespread [[power outage|blackout]]s.<ref name="HC-20210215"/> At 1:25&nbsp;a.m. on February 15, ERCOT began requesting blackouts from service providers.<ref name="TT-20210216">{{cite news |last1=Douglas |first1=Erin |title=Texas largely relies on natural gas for power. It wasn't ready for the extreme cold |url=https://www.texastribune.org/2021/02/16/natural-gas-power-storm/ |work=[[The Texas Tribune]] |date=February 16, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210218002049/https://www.texastribune.org/2021/02/16/natural-gas-power-storm/ |archive-date=February 18, 2021 |url-status=live}}</ref> On February 16, electricity shortages caused the price of electricity to spike to over $9,000 per [[megawatt-hour]] (MWh),<ref name="HC-20210215"/><ref>{{cite web |title=LMP Contour Map: Real-Time Market - Locational Marginal Pricing |url=http://www.ercot.com/content/cdr/contours/rtmLmp.html |website=ERCOT |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210216022444/http://www.ercot.com/content/cdr/contours/rtmLmp.html |archive-date=February 16, 2021 |date=February 15, 2021 |url-status=dead}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |title=Real-Time Settlement Point Prices Display for February 16, 2021 |url=http://www.ercot.com/content/cdr/html/20210216_real_time_spp |website=ERCOT |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210217050804/http://www.ercot.com/content/cdr/html/20210216_real_time_spp |archive-date=February 17, 2021 |date=February 16, 2021 |url-status=live}}</ref> whereas the week before, the lowest price of power had been less than $30 a MWh.<ref name="WP-20210216"/><ref>{{cite web |title=Real-Time Settlement Point Prices Display for February 10, 2021 |url=http://www.ercot.com/content/cdr/html/20210210_real_time_spp |website=ERCOT |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210217121038/http://www.ercot.com/content/cdr/html/20210210_real_time_spp |archive-date=February 17, 2021 |date=February 10, 2021 |url-status=live}}</ref> Some retail electricity providers were possibly facing huge losses or bankruptcy,<ref>{{cite news |last1=Eckhouse |first1=Brian |title=Surging Texas Power Prices Promise Both Doom and Riches |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-02-16/skyrocketing-texas-power-prices-may-enrich-some-bankrupt-others |work=[[Bloomberg News]] |date=February 16, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210217024107/https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-02-16/skyrocketing-texas-power-prices-may-enrich-some-bankrupt-others |archive-date=February 17, 2021 |url-status=live}}</ref> and customers of [[Griddy]] reported receiving absurdly high electric bills.<ref>{{cite news |title='People Are Greedy': The Absurd Electric Bills Slamming Texans |url=https://www.thedailybeast.com/dollar5152-power-bill-texas-winter-storm-hell-only-gets-worse |work=[[Daily Beast]] |date=February 17, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210218094102/https://www.thedailybeast.com/dollar5152-power-bill-texas-winter-storm-hell-only-gets-worse |archive-date=February 18, 2021 |url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |title=Letter from Griddy about the storm and prices |url=https://www.griddy.com/post/letter-from-griddy-about-the-storm-and-prices |publisher=griddy.com |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210216181724mp_/https://www.griddy.com/post/letter-from-griddy-about-the-storm-and-prices |archive-date=February 16, 2021 |date=February 15, 2021 |url-status=live}}</ref>
During a major cold-weather event in mid-February 2021, ERCOT declared a statewide emergency, due to a 34,000 MW shortfall in generation that caused widespread [[power outage|blackout]]s.<ref name="HC-20210215"/> At 1:25&nbsp;a.m. on February 15, ERCOT began requesting blackouts from service providers.<ref name="TT-20210216">{{cite news |last1=Douglas |first1=Erin |title=Texas largely relies on natural gas for power. It wasn't ready for the extreme cold |url=https://www.texastribune.org/2021/02/16/natural-gas-power-storm/ |work=[[The Texas Tribune]] |date=February 16, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210218002049/https://www.texastribune.org/2021/02/16/natural-gas-power-storm/ |archive-date=February 18, 2021 |url-status=live}}</ref> On February 16, electricity shortages caused the price of electricity to spike to over $9,000 per [[megawatt-hour]] (MWh),<ref name="HC-20210215"/><ref>{{cite web |title=LMP Contour Map: Real-Time Market - Locational Marginal Pricing |url=http://www.ercot.com/content/cdr/contours/rtmLmp.html |website=ERCOT |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210216022444/http://www.ercot.com/content/cdr/contours/rtmLmp.html |archive-date=February 16, 2021 |date=February 15, 2021 |url-status=dead}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |title=Real-Time Settlement Point Prices Display for February 16, 2021 |url=http://www.ercot.com/content/cdr/html/20210216_real_time_spp |website=ERCOT |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210217050804/http://www.ercot.com/content/cdr/html/20210216_real_time_spp |archive-date=February 17, 2021 |date=February 16, 2021 |url-status=live}}</ref> whereas the week before, the lowest price of power had been less than $30 per MWh.<ref name="WP-20210216"/><ref>{{cite web |title=Real-Time Settlement Point Prices Display for February 10, 2021 |url=http://www.ercot.com/content/cdr/html/20210210_real_time_spp |website=ERCOT |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210217121038/http://www.ercot.com/content/cdr/html/20210210_real_time_spp |archive-date=February 17, 2021 |date=February 10, 2021 |url-status=live}}</ref> Some retail electricity providers were possibly facing huge losses or bankruptcy,<ref>{{cite news |last1=Eckhouse |first1=Brian |title=Surging Texas Power Prices Promise Both Doom and Riches |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-02-16/skyrocketing-texas-power-prices-may-enrich-some-bankrupt-others |work=[[Bloomberg News]] |date=February 16, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210217024107/https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-02-16/skyrocketing-texas-power-prices-may-enrich-some-bankrupt-others |archive-date=February 17, 2021 |url-status=live}}</ref> and customers of [[Griddy (company)|Griddy]] reported receiving absurdly high electric bills.<ref>{{cite news |title='People Are Greedy': The Absurd Electric Bills Slamming Texans |url=https://www.thedailybeast.com/dollar5152-power-bill-texas-winter-storm-hell-only-gets-worse |work=[[Daily Beast]] |date=February 17, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210218094102/https://www.thedailybeast.com/dollar5152-power-bill-texas-winter-storm-hell-only-gets-worse |archive-date=February 18, 2021 |url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |title=Letter from Griddy about the storm and prices |url=https://www.griddy.com/post/letter-from-griddy-about-the-storm-and-prices |publisher=griddy.com |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210216181724/https://www.griddy.com/post/letter-from-griddy-about-the-storm-and-prices |archive-date=February 16, 2021 |date=February 15, 2021 |url-status=live}}</ref>


Approximately 4 million customers in Texas were without electricity for various times during the multi-day storm.<ref name="HC-20210215">{{cite news |last1=de Luna |first1=Marcy |last2=Drane |first2=Amanda |title=What went wrong with the Texas power grid? |url=https://www.houstonchronicle.com/business/energy/article/Wholesale-power-prices-spiking-across-Texas-15951684.php |work=[[Houston Chronicle]] |date=February 15, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210217080525/https://www.houstonchronicle.com/business/energy/article/Wholesale-power-prices-spiking-across-Texas-15951684.php |archive-date=February 17, 2021 |url-status=live}}</ref> At first, rotating outages lasting from 10 to 40 minutes were imposed on millions of customers, but those outages lasted many hours for some and over 48 hours for others, while millions more were spared from any hardship.<ref>{{cite news |title=ERCOT asks Austin Energy to shed more power, could mean outages for emergency services |url=https://www.statesman.com/story/news/2021/02/16/texas-power-outages-ercot-asks-austin-energy-shed-power/6763860002/ |work=[[Austin American-Statesman]] |date=February 16, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210216221902if_/https://www.statesman.com/story/news/2021/02/16/texas-power-outages-ercot-asks-austin-energy-shed-power/6763860002/ |archive-date=February 16, 2021 |url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |last1=Oberg |first1=Ted |last2=Rafique |first2=Sarah |title=48 hours without power a 'nightmare' as residents demand answers |url=https://abc13.com/weather/48-hours-without-power-a-nightmare-as-residents-demand-answers/10345836/ |work=[[KTRK-TV]] |date=February 16, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210217125927/https://abc13.com/weather/48-hours-without-power-a-nightmare-as-residents-demand-answers/10345836/ |archive-date=February 17, 2021 |url-status=live}}</ref> During the power loss, some Texans were forced to survive in record freezing temperatures down to {{convert|-2|F|C}}.<ref>{{cite web |title=A Full List of All The Record Cold Texas Temperatures |url=https://www.baynews9.com/fl/tampa/weather/2021/02/15/a-full-list-of-all-the-record-cold-texas-temperatures |publisher=[[Bay News 9]] |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210216194942/https://www.baynews9.com/fl/tampa/weather/2021/02/15/a-full-list-of-all-the-record-cold-texas-temperatures |archive-date=February 16, 2021 |date=February 17, 2021 |url-status=live}}</ref>
Approximately 4 million customers in Texas were without electricity for various times during the multi-day storm.<ref name="HC-20210215">{{cite news |last1=de Luna |first1=Marcy |last2=Drane |first2=Amanda |title=What went wrong with the Texas power grid? |url=https://www.houstonchronicle.com/business/energy/article/Wholesale-power-prices-spiking-across-Texas-15951684.php |work=[[Houston Chronicle]] |date=February 15, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210217080525/https://www.houstonchronicle.com/business/energy/article/Wholesale-power-prices-spiking-across-Texas-15951684.php |archive-date=February 17, 2021 |url-status=live}}</ref> At first, rotating outages lasting from 10 to 40 minutes were imposed on millions of customers, but those outages lasted many hours for some and over 48 hours for others, while millions more were spared from any hardship.<ref>{{cite news |title=ERCOT asks Austin Energy to shed more power, could mean outages for emergency services |url=https://www.statesman.com/story/news/2021/02/16/texas-power-outages-ercot-asks-austin-energy-shed-power/6763860002/ |work=[[Austin American-Statesman]] |date=February 16, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210216221902if_/https://www.statesman.com/story/news/2021/02/16/texas-power-outages-ercot-asks-austin-energy-shed-power/6763860002/ |archive-date=February 16, 2021 |url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |last1=Oberg |first1=Ted |last2=Rafique |first2=Sarah |title=48 hours without power a 'nightmare' as residents demand answers |url=https://abc13.com/weather/48-hours-without-power-a-nightmare-as-residents-demand-answers/10345836/ |work=[[KTRK-TV]] |date=February 16, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210217125927/https://abc13.com/weather/48-hours-without-power-a-nightmare-as-residents-demand-answers/10345836/ |archive-date=February 17, 2021 |url-status=live}}</ref> During the power loss, some Texans were forced to survive in record freezing temperatures down to {{convert|-2|F|C}}.<ref>{{cite web |title=A Full List of All The Record Cold Texas Temperatures |url=https://www.baynews9.com/fl/tampa/weather/2021/02/15/a-full-list-of-all-the-record-cold-texas-temperatures |publisher=[[Bay News 9]] |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210216194942/https://www.baynews9.com/fl/tampa/weather/2021/02/15/a-full-list-of-all-the-record-cold-texas-temperatures |archive-date=February 16, 2021 |date=February 17, 2021 |url-status=live}}</ref>
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The first lawsuits against ERCOT grid mismanagement were filed on February 19, 2021.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Lawsuits against ERCOT allege warnings about Texas grid issues 'consciously ignored'|url=https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/us/lawsuits-against-ercot-allege-warnings-about-texas-grid-issues-consciously-ignored/ar-BB1dRHz4|access-date=2021-02-21|website=www.msn.com}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|last=Barrabi|first=Thomas|date=2021-02-19|title=Texas power grid operator ERCOT sued over blackouts|url=https://www.foxnews.com/politics/texas-power-grid-operator-ercot-sued-over-blackouts|access-date=2021-02-21|website=Fox News|language=en-US}}</ref> On March 8, 2021, ERCOT began releasing a weekly market notice that includes entities that have paid previously identified short-pay amounts and provides an updated estimate of the aggregate outstanding short-pay amount.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Regulatory Coverage: ERCOT Discloses Short-Pay Balance of $2.5B; Organization to Release Weekly Short-Pay Report Starting March 8|url=https://reorg.com/electric-reliability-council-of-texas-short-pay-balance/|access-date=2021-03-11|website=www.reorg.com}}</ref>
The first lawsuits against ERCOT grid mismanagement were filed on February 19, 2021.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Lawsuits against ERCOT allege warnings about Texas grid issues 'consciously ignored'|url=https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/us/lawsuits-against-ercot-allege-warnings-about-texas-grid-issues-consciously-ignored/ar-BB1dRHz4|access-date=2021-02-21|website=www.msn.com}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|last=Barrabi|first=Thomas|date=2021-02-19|title=Texas power grid operator ERCOT sued over blackouts|url=https://www.foxnews.com/politics/texas-power-grid-operator-ercot-sued-over-blackouts|access-date=2021-02-21|website=Fox News|language=en-US}}</ref> On March 8, 2021, ERCOT began releasing a weekly market notice that includes entities that have paid previously identified short-pay amounts and provides an updated estimate of the aggregate outstanding short-pay amount.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Regulatory Coverage: ERCOT Discloses Short-Pay Balance of $2.5B; Organization to Release Weekly Short-Pay Report Starting March 8|url=https://reorg.com/electric-reliability-council-of-texas-short-pay-balance/|access-date=2021-03-11|website=www.reorg.com}}</ref>


On February 16, 2021, it was reported that at least 10 deaths were linked to the 2021 ERCOT grid power outages.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Staff|first=Texas Tribune|date=2021-02-16|title=Winter storm in Texas: At least 10 deaths linked to statewide disaster; Austin outages may last another day or more|url=https://www.texastribune.org/2021/02/16/texas-winter-storm-power-outage-ercot/|access-date=2021-04-03|website=The Texas Tribune|language=en}}</ref> By late March, the total number of deaths surpassed 110.<ref>{{Cite web|date=2021-03-25|title=Texas' death toll from February storm, outages surpasses 100|url=https://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2021/mar/25/texas-death-toll-february-storm-outages-surpasses-/|access-date=2021-04-03|website=Arkansas Online|language=en}}</ref> A comprehensive review of news reports, death certificates, and lawsuit filings from every county in Texas led a team of journalists in Houston to set the death toll at 194,<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.texasstandard.org/stories/nearly-200-people-died-in-februarys-winter-storm-double-the-states-initial-estimate/ |title=Nearly 200 People Died In February's Winter Storm, Double The State's Initial Estimate |website=Texas Standard |date=6 April 2021 |access-date=June 14, 2021}}</ref> while a later review of excess deaths by journalists at BuzzFeed estimated the full indirect mortalities to be between 426 and 978.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/peteraldhous/texas-winter-storm-power-outage-death-toll |title=The Texas Winter Storm And Power Outages Killed Hundreds More People Than The State Says |website=BuzzFeed News |access-date=June 14, 2021}}</ref> An 11-year-old boy, Cristian Pavon, who died of suspected hypothermia was among the deaths caused by ERCOT's grid system. Pavon's family sued [[Entergy Texas]] and ERCOT for gross negligence.<ref>{{Cite news|last=Salcedo|first=Andrea|date=February 22, 2021|title=Family of 11-year-old boy who died in unheated Texas mobile home sues power companies for over $100 million|newspaper=[[Washington Post]]|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2021/02/22/texas-boy-death-winterstorm-lawsuit/|url-status=live|access-date=April 3, 2021}}</ref>
On February 16, 2021, it was reported that at least 10 deaths were linked to the 2021 ERCOT grid power outages.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Staff|first=Texas Tribune|date=2021-02-16|title=Winter storm in Texas: At least 10 deaths linked to statewide disaster; Austin outages may last another day or more|url=https://www.texastribune.org/2021/02/16/texas-winter-storm-power-outage-ercot/|access-date=2021-04-03|website=The Texas Tribune|language=en}}</ref> By late March, the total number of deaths surpassed 110.<ref>{{Cite web|date=2021-03-25|title=Texas' death toll from February storm, outages surpasses 100|url=https://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2021/mar/25/texas-death-toll-february-storm-outages-surpasses-/|access-date=2021-04-03|website=Arkansas Online|language=en}}</ref> A comprehensive review of news reports, death certificates, and lawsuit filings from every county in Texas led a team of journalists in Houston to set the death toll at 194,<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.texasstandard.org/stories/nearly-200-people-died-in-februarys-winter-storm-double-the-states-initial-estimate/ |title=Nearly 200 People Died In February's Winter Storm, Double The State's Initial Estimate |website=Texas Standard |date=6 April 2021 |access-date=June 14, 2021}}</ref> while a later review of excess deaths by journalists at BuzzFeed estimated the full indirect mortalities to be between 426 and 978.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/peteraldhous/texas-winter-storm-power-outage-death-toll |title=The Texas Winter Storm And Power Outages Killed Hundreds More People Than The State Says |website=BuzzFeed News |access-date=June 14, 2021}}</ref> An 11-year-old boy, Cristian Pavon, who died of suspected hypothermia was among the deaths caused by ERCOT's grid system. Pavon's family sued Entergy Texas and ERCOT for gross negligence.<ref>{{Cite news|last=Salcedo|first=Andrea|date=February 22, 2021|title=Family of 11-year-old boy who died in unheated Texas mobile home sues power companies for over $100 million|newspaper=[[Washington Post]]|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2021/02/22/texas-boy-death-winterstorm-lawsuit/|access-date=April 3, 2021}}</ref>

Bill Magness, CEO of ERCOT, was fired on March 4, 2021, for his role in the [[2021 Texas power crisis|2021 power loss incident]].<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2021/03/04/ercot-ceo-bill-magness-terminated-power-outages-texas/6917885002/|title=Texas power grid CEO fired after deadly February power outages|first=Madlin|last=Mekelburg|website=USA TODAY}}</ref> The board delivered a 60-day termination notice to Magness, who had been president and CEO since 2016. The board said he would serve in those roles for the next two months.<ref>The Wall Street Journal, "Texas Power Grid Operator Fires CEO," March 4, 2021 [https://www.wsj.com/articles/texas-power-grid-operator-fires-ceo-11614834450?mod=hp_lead_pos12]</ref>

=== 2023 shift in electricity generation mix ===
In 2023, Texas's energy landscape saw significant growth in solar capacity, notably on the ERCOT grid, with solar installations, including those with storage, increasing by 35% from the previous year, leading to a reduction in midday [[natural gas]] usage. [[Solar power|Solar generation]] peaked at 5.3 GWh in the summer and 3.8 GWh in the winter, while wind generation remained the largest renewable contributor at 108,000 GWh. ERCOT anticipates a substantial rise in solar capacity, with plans for 24 GW of solar and 13 GW of battery storage additions by 2025, compared to a modest 3 GW increase in both wind and natural gas capacities.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Antonio |first=Katherine |last2=Peterson |first2=Kimberly |date=April 9, 2024 |title=Solar capacity additions are changing the shape of daily electricity supply in Texas |url=https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=61783 |access-date=10 April 2024 |website=www.eia.gov}}</ref>


==Governance==
==Governance==
ERCOT is governed by a board of directors and subject to oversight by the [[Public Utility Commission of Texas]] (PUC) and the [[Texas Legislature]].<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.ercot.com/about/governance/|title=Governance|website=www.ercot.com}}</ref><ref name="ERCOT-About">{{cite web|url=http://www.ercot.com/about/|title=About ERCOT|website=www.ercot.com}}</ref>
ERCOT is governed by a board of directors and subject to oversight by the [[Public Utility Commission of Texas]] (PUC) and the [[Texas Legislature]].<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.ercot.com/about/governance/|title=Governance|website=www.ercot.com}}</ref><ref name="ERCOT-About">{{cite web|url=http://www.ercot.com/about/|title=About ERCOT|website=www.ercot.com}}</ref>


The PUC has primary jurisdiction over activities conducted by ERCOT. Three PUC commissioners, including the chair, are appointed by the governor of Texas.<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://www.puc.texas.gov/agency/rulesnlaws/statutes/Pura11.pdf |title=Archived copy |access-date=2013-04-22 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130202183521/http://www.puc.texas.gov/agency/rulesnlaws/statutes/Pura11.pdf |archive-date=2013-02-02 |url-status=dead }}</ref>
The PUC has primary jurisdiction over activities conducted by ERCOT. Three PUC commissioners, including the chair, are appointed by the governor of Texas.<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://www.puc.texas.gov/agency/rulesnlaws/statutes/Pura11.pdf |title=Public Utility Regulatory Act |access-date=2013-04-22 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130202183521/http://www.puc.texas.gov/agency/rulesnlaws/statutes/Pura11.pdf |archive-date=2013-02-02 |url-status=dead }}</ref>


The ERCOT organization is governed by a board of directors made up of independent members, consumers and representatives from each of ERCOT's electric market segments.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.ercot.com/about/governance/directors.html|title=Board of Directors|website=www.ercot.com}}</ref>
The ERCOT organization is governed by a board of directors made up of independent members, consumers and representatives from each of ERCOT's electric market segments.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.ercot.com/about/governance/directors.html|title=Board of Directors|website=www.ercot.com}}</ref>
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The ERCOT board appoints ERCOT's officers to direct and manage ERCOT's day-to-day operations, accompanied by a team of executives and managers responsible for critical components of ERCOT's operation.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.ercot.com/about/governance/executives.html|title=Executive Team|website=www.ercot.com}}</ref>
The ERCOT board appoints ERCOT's officers to direct and manage ERCOT's day-to-day operations, accompanied by a team of executives and managers responsible for critical components of ERCOT's operation.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.ercot.com/about/governance/executives.html|title=Executive Team|website=www.ercot.com}}</ref>


During the February 2021 storm, it emerged that a third of ERCOT's board of directors live outside of Texas; this includes the chair Sally A. Talberg, who lives in Michigan, and the vice chair Peter Cramton.<ref name="MekelburgAAS">{{cite web |last1=Mekelburg |first1=Madlin |title=ERCOT is in charge of Texas' power, but one-third of its board lives out of state |url=https://www.statesman.com/story/news/politics/2021/02/16/ercot-board-under-fire-texas-five-out-state-members/6768919002/ |publisher=[[Austin American-Statesman]] |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210217154057/https://www.statesman.com/story/news/politics/2021/02/16/ercot-board-under-fire-texas-five-out-state-members/6768919002/ |archive-date=February 17, 2021 |date=February 16, 2021 |url-status=live}}</ref> This revelation drew considerable anger from the public as well as elected representatives, and the board members' names and photographs were temporarily removed from the ERCOT website due to [[death threat]]s.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Palmer |first1=Ewan |title=ERCOT Removes Names of Board Members from Site Following Death Threats Over Texas Outages |url=https://www.newsweek.com/ercot-board-members-death-threats-texas-1570128 |work=[[Newsweek]] |date=February 18, 2021}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|title=ERCOT Will Restore Board of Directors' Names to Website After Death Threats Prompted Their Removal|url=https://www.newsweek.com/ercot-will-restore-board-directors-names-website-after-death-threats-prompted-their-removal-1570320|access-date=2021-02-21|date=2021-02-18|work=Newsweek|last=Fallon|first=Nicole}}</ref> The board was also criticized for its meeting days before the storm: though the meeting lasted more than two hours, the members spent less than a minute discussing storm preparations and readiness.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Mekelburg|first=Madlin|title=ERCOT officials spent 40 seconds on winter storm preparedness at Feb. 9 meeting|url=https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2021/02/19/winter-storm-texas-ercot-officials-spent-40-seconds-preparedness-meeting/4512191001/|access-date=2021-02-21|website=USA TODAY|language=en-US}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|last=Cienfuegos|first=Dillon Collier, Luis|date=2021-02-18|title=ERCOT board meeting last week included joke about cowboy boots, less than 40 seconds of storm talk|url=https://www.ksat.com/news/defenders/2021/02/18/ercot-board-meeting-last-week-included-joke-about-cowboy-boots-less-than-40-seconds-of-storm-talk/|access-date=2021-02-21|website=KSAT|language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|title=Listen to ERCOT leaders spend 40 seconds on preparedness before Texas winter storm|url=https://www.statesman.com/videos/news/2021/02/19/listen-ercot-leaders-spend-40-seconds-preparedness-before-texas-winter-storm-power-outage-crisis/4508794001/|access-date=2021-02-21|website=Austin American-Statesman|language=en-US}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|title=ERCOT leaders spent less than a minute discussing winter storm preparedness at Feb. 9 meeting|url=https://www.kiiitv.com/article/news/local/texas/texas-power-outages-ercot-meeting-before-winter-storm-hit/269-86a97580-81b0-48da-821e-fa9167aa42b9|access-date=2021-02-21|website=kiiitv.com|date=19 February 2021 |language=en-US}}</ref> On February 23, ERCOT announced the resignation of five out-of-state board members effective the end of the board meeting the following day.<ref>{{Cite web|last1=Douglas|first1=Erin|last2=Ferman|first2=Mitchell|date=2021-02-23|title=ERCOT board members who live outside of Texas are resigning in the aftermath of the power outage, winter storm|url=https://www.texastribune.org/2021/02/23/ercot-members-resign-texas/|url-status=live|access-date=2021-02-24|website=The Texas Tribune|language=en|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210223211936/https://www.texastribune.org/2021/02/23/ercot-members-resign-texas/ |archive-date=2021-02-23 }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|title=4 ERCOT board members to resign amid backlash over Texas storm|url=https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/us/4-ercot-board-members-to-resign-amid-backlash-over-texas-storm/ar-BB1dX7nh|access-date=2021-02-24|website=www.msn.com}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|title=5 ERCOT board members who live outside of Texas resign in aftermath of power outage, winter storm|url=https://www.khou.com/article/news/local/texas/ercot-board-members-who-live-outside-of-texas-resign/285-8221ebf4-c902-413b-b55b-215a035a4456|access-date=2021-02-24|website=khou.com|language=en-US}}</ref>
During the February 2021 storm, it emerged that a third of ERCOT's board of directors lived outside of Texas: Chairperson Sally A. Talberg lived in Michigan, Vice-Chair Peter Cramton lived in California and worked for universities in Germany and Maryland, and three board members lived in Toronto, Illinois, and Maine respectively.<ref name="MekelburgAAS">{{cite web |last1=Mekelburg |first1=Madlin |title=ERCOT is in charge of Texas' power, but one-third of its board lives out of state |url=https://www.statesman.com/story/news/politics/2021/02/16/ercot-board-under-fire-texas-five-out-state-members/6768919002/ |publisher=[[Austin American-Statesman]] |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210217154057/https://www.statesman.com/story/news/politics/2021/02/16/ercot-board-under-fire-texas-five-out-state-members/6768919002/ |archive-date=February 17, 2021 |date=February 16, 2021 |url-status=live}}</ref> This revelation drew considerable anger from the public as well as elected representatives, and the board members' names and photographs were temporarily removed from the ERCOT website due to [[death threat]]s.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Palmer |first1=Ewan |title=ERCOT Removes Names of Board Members from Site Following Death Threats Over Texas Outages |url=https://www.newsweek.com/ercot-board-members-death-threats-texas-1570128 |work=[[Newsweek]] |date=February 18, 2021}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|title=ERCOT Will Restore Board of Directors' Names to Website After Death Threats Prompted Their Removal|url=https://www.newsweek.com/ercot-will-restore-board-directors-names-website-after-death-threats-prompted-their-removal-1570320|access-date=2021-02-21|date=2021-02-18|work=Newsweek|last=Fallon|first=Nicole}}</ref> The board was also criticized for its meeting days before the storm: though the meeting lasted more than two hours, the members spent less than a minute discussing storm preparations and readiness.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Mekelburg|first=Madlin|title=ERCOT officials spent 40 seconds on winter storm preparedness at Feb. 9 meeting|url=https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2021/02/19/winter-storm-texas-ercot-officials-spent-40-seconds-preparedness-meeting/4512191001/|access-date=2021-02-21|website=USA TODAY|language=en-US}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|last1=Collier|first1=Dillon|last2=Cienfuegos|first2=Luis|date=2021-02-18|title=ERCOT board meeting last week included joke about cowboy boots, less than 40 seconds of storm talk|url=https://www.ksat.com/news/defenders/2021/02/18/ercot-board-meeting-last-week-included-joke-about-cowboy-boots-less-than-40-seconds-of-storm-talk/|access-date=2021-02-21|website=KSAT|language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|title=Listen to ERCOT leaders spend 40 seconds on preparedness before Texas winter storm|url=https://www.statesman.com/videos/news/2021/02/19/listen-ercot-leaders-spend-40-seconds-preparedness-before-texas-winter-storm-power-outage-crisis/4508794001/|access-date=2021-02-21|website=Austin American-Statesman|language=en-US}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|title=ERCOT leaders spent less than a minute discussing winter storm preparedness at Feb. 9 meeting|url=https://www.kiiitv.com/article/news/local/texas/texas-power-outages-ercot-meeting-before-winter-storm-hit/269-86a97580-81b0-48da-821e-fa9167aa42b9|access-date=2021-02-21|website=kiiitv.com|date=19 February 2021 |language=en-US}}</ref> On February 23, ERCOT announced the resignation of the five out-of-state board members effective the end of the board meeting the following day.<ref>{{Cite web|last1=Douglas|first1=Erin|last2=Ferman|first2=Mitchell|date=2021-02-23|title=ERCOT board members who live outside of Texas are resigning in the aftermath of the power outage, winter storm|url=https://www.texastribune.org/2021/02/23/ercot-members-resign-texas/|url-status=live|access-date=2021-02-24|website=The Texas Tribune|language=en|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210223211936/https://www.texastribune.org/2021/02/23/ercot-members-resign-texas/ |archive-date=2021-02-23 }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|title=4 ERCOT board members to resign amid backlash over Texas storm|url=https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/us/4-ercot-board-members-to-resign-amid-backlash-over-texas-storm/ar-BB1dX7nh|access-date=2021-02-24|website=www.msn.com}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|title=5 ERCOT board members who live outside of Texas resign in aftermath of power outage, winter storm|url=https://www.khou.com/article/news/local/texas/ercot-board-members-who-live-outside-of-texas-resign/285-8221ebf4-c902-413b-b55b-215a035a4456|access-date=2021-02-24|website=khou.com|language=en-US}}</ref> In October 2021, El Paso billionaire Paul Foster became the new Chairperson even though El Paso is not part of the Texas power grid. The other open positions were filled afterwards.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Kolenc |first1=Vic |title=El Paso businessman Paul Foster named chairman of ERCOT board that manages Texas power grid |url=https://www.elpasotimes.com/story/news/2021/10/19/paul-foster-chairman-ercot-board/8523739002/ |access-date=18 June 2024 |work=El Paso Times |date=19 October 2021}}</ref> Foster resigned in June 2024.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Bennett |first1=Adam |title='These statements don’t line up'. ERCOT says it's ready for summer but experts remain skeptical |url=https://www.kvue.com/article/news/local/texas/summer-outlook-power-grid-texas-ercot-prepared-experts-skeptical/269-86830578-10c3-44b1-8726-2eff0a3ef130 |access-date=19 June 2024 |work=KVUE (ABC news affiliate) |date=18 June 2024}}</ref>


===Organizational affairs===
===Organizational affairs===

Revision as of 00:41, 19 June 2024

Electric Reliability Council of Texas, Inc. (ERCOT)
Type501(c)(4), charitable organization
74-2587416[1]
HeadquartersAustin, Texas
Chief Executive Officer
Pablo Vegas[2]
Bill Flores (interim)
Vice Chair, Board of Directors
Bill Flores
Websiteercot.com
ISOs and RTOs of North America as of 18 March 2021

The Electric Reliability Council of Texas, Inc. (ERCOT) is an American organization that operates Texas's electrical grid, the Texas Interconnection,[3][4] which supplies power to more than 25 million Texas customers and represents 90 percent of the state's electric load.[5] ERCOT is the first independent system operator (ISO) in the United States.[6] ERCOT works with the Texas Reliability Entity (TRE),[7] one of six regional entities within the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) that coordinate to improve reliability of the bulk power grid.[8]

As the ISO for the region, ERCOT dispatches power on an electric grid that connects more than 46,500 miles of transmission lines and more than 610 generation units.[9] ERCOT also performs financial settlements for the competitive wholesale bulk-power market and administers retail switching for 7 million premises in competitive choice areas.[9]

According to an ERCOT report, the major sources of generating capacity in Texas are natural gas (51%), wind (24.8%), coal (13.4%), nuclear (4.9%), solar (3.8%), and hydroelectric or biomass-fired units (1.9%).[10]

ERCOT is a membership-based 501(c)(4) nonprofit corporation,[11][12] and its members include consumers, electric cooperatives, generators, power marketers, retail electric providers, investor-owned electric utilities (transmission and distribution providers), and municipally owned electric utilities.[13]

Power demand in the ERCOT region is typically highest in summer, primarily due to air conditioning use in homes and businesses. The ERCOT region's all-time record peak hour occurred on August 10, 2023, when consumer demand hit 85,508 MW.[14] A megawatt of electricity can power about 200 Texas homes during periods of peak demand.[15] By 2022, ERCOT had 2 GW of grid batteries, with another 6 GW underway.[16]

History

At the beginning of World War II, several electric utilities in Texas agreed to operate together as the Texas Interconnected System (TIS) to support the war effort. During the war, the grid was interconnected to other states and excess power generation was sent to industries on the Gulf Coast, providing a more reliable supply of electricity for production of metal and other material needed for the war.[17]

Recognizing the reliability advantages of remaining interconnected, TIS members continued to operate and develop the interconnected grid. TIS members adopted official operating guides for their interconnected power system and established two monitoring centers within the control centers of two utilities, one in North Texas and one in South Texas.

In 1970, ERCOT was formed to comply with NERC requirements. However, the Texas grid is not subject to regulation under the Federal Power Act, being an intrastate grid for the purposes of that law. On May 4, 1976, Central Southwest Holdings attempted to force the issue, with an event that was later called the "Midnight Connection", where it connected the grid to Oklahoma for a few hours. This caused lawsuits about whether federal regulation then applied, however the judgement was that this was not sufficient.[17]

The deregulation of the Texas electricity market occurred in two phases: the wholesale generation market in 1995 and the rest of the sector in 1999.[18] The 1999 deregulation was aimed at counteracting a shortage of generation capacity in the state.[19] Since deregulation, retail providers and power generators were unregulated, although regulations on transmitters continued to control the placement of electrical lines. The legislation abolished the former system, in which power was both generated and consumed locally.[18] Instead, under the deregulated regime, retailers could contract with providers across the state, creating a complex market.[18] The 1999 deregulation also dropped limits on rate increases. Prior to deregulation, residential electricity rates were significantly below the national average; after deregulation, residential electricity rates increased, rising 64% between 1999 and 2007.[20]

2011 winter storm power losses

In early February 2011, a major winter storm impacted Texas; freezing and extreme cold at natural gas pipelines and wells, as well as generating units (such as coal-fired power plants and wind turbines) caused power outages across Texas affecting 3.2 million customers. ERCOT and its regulator, the Public Utility Commission of Texas, failed to adopt a mandatory standard for preparing electricity infrastructure for such occurrences (winterization), despite recommendations from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC). Texas's failure to prepare left the state vulnerable to winter-storm blackouts, including the major disaster that occurred ten years later in February 2021.[21]

2021 winter storm power losses

Natural gas prices spiked to $23.86 on February 17, 2021[22]
In February 2003 there was a similar spike in natural gas prices because of shortages[23]
Reduced electricity from coal, nuclear, and wind power plants contributed to the shortage on February 15 and afterwards.[24]
Texas Power Crisis February 2021

During a major cold-weather event in mid-February 2021, ERCOT declared a statewide emergency, due to a 34,000 MW shortfall in generation that caused widespread blackouts.[25] At 1:25 a.m. on February 15, ERCOT began requesting blackouts from service providers.[26] On February 16, electricity shortages caused the price of electricity to spike to over $9,000 per megawatt-hour (MWh),[25][27][28] whereas the week before, the lowest price of power had been less than $30 per MWh.[29][30] Some retail electricity providers were possibly facing huge losses or bankruptcy,[31] and customers of Griddy reported receiving absurdly high electric bills.[32][33]

Approximately 4 million customers in Texas were without electricity for various times during the multi-day storm.[25] At first, rotating outages lasting from 10 to 40 minutes were imposed on millions of customers, but those outages lasted many hours for some and over 48 hours for others, while millions more were spared from any hardship.[34][35] During the power loss, some Texans were forced to survive in record freezing temperatures down to −2 °F (−19 °C).[36]

On February 16, Governor Greg Abbott declared that ERCOT reform would be an emergency priority for the state legislature, and there would be an investigation of the power outage to determine long-term solutions.[37] A 357-page report had been written after the 2011 power outage in Texas,[38] which seemed to have been ignored, because too many critical generators still lacked appropriate weatherization in 2021,[29][39] especially the natural gas system.[26]

Texans outside the ERCOT-controlled grid had a different power experience.[4] Relatively few electric customers lost power in those regions. In counties around El Paso in western Texas, El Paso Electric reported that, as a result of it having investing millions in cold weather upgrades after the 2011 cold snap, 3,000 customers lost power for less than five minutes. In counties around Beaumont in eastern Texas, Entergy suffered relatively few outages either, because of previous winterization efforts.[40]

The first lawsuits against ERCOT grid mismanagement were filed on February 19, 2021.[41][42] On March 8, 2021, ERCOT began releasing a weekly market notice that includes entities that have paid previously identified short-pay amounts and provides an updated estimate of the aggregate outstanding short-pay amount.[43]

On February 16, 2021, it was reported that at least 10 deaths were linked to the 2021 ERCOT grid power outages.[44] By late March, the total number of deaths surpassed 110.[45] A comprehensive review of news reports, death certificates, and lawsuit filings from every county in Texas led a team of journalists in Houston to set the death toll at 194,[46] while a later review of excess deaths by journalists at BuzzFeed estimated the full indirect mortalities to be between 426 and 978.[47] An 11-year-old boy, Cristian Pavon, who died of suspected hypothermia was among the deaths caused by ERCOT's grid system. Pavon's family sued Entergy Texas and ERCOT for gross negligence.[48]

Bill Magness, CEO of ERCOT, was fired on March 4, 2021, for his role in the 2021 power loss incident.[49] The board delivered a 60-day termination notice to Magness, who had been president and CEO since 2016. The board said he would serve in those roles for the next two months.[50]

2023 shift in electricity generation mix

In 2023, Texas's energy landscape saw significant growth in solar capacity, notably on the ERCOT grid, with solar installations, including those with storage, increasing by 35% from the previous year, leading to a reduction in midday natural gas usage. Solar generation peaked at 5.3 GWh in the summer and 3.8 GWh in the winter, while wind generation remained the largest renewable contributor at 108,000 GWh. ERCOT anticipates a substantial rise in solar capacity, with plans for 24 GW of solar and 13 GW of battery storage additions by 2025, compared to a modest 3 GW increase in both wind and natural gas capacities.[51]

Governance

ERCOT is governed by a board of directors and subject to oversight by the Public Utility Commission of Texas (PUC) and the Texas Legislature.[52][11]

The PUC has primary jurisdiction over activities conducted by ERCOT. Three PUC commissioners, including the chair, are appointed by the governor of Texas.[53]

The ERCOT organization is governed by a board of directors made up of independent members, consumers and representatives from each of ERCOT's electric market segments.[54]

The Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) makes policy recommendations to the ERCOT Board of Directors. The TAC is assisted by five standing subcommittees as well as numerous workgroups and task forces.[55]

The ERCOT board appoints ERCOT's officers to direct and manage ERCOT's day-to-day operations, accompanied by a team of executives and managers responsible for critical components of ERCOT's operation.[56]

During the February 2021 storm, it emerged that a third of ERCOT's board of directors lived outside of Texas: Chairperson Sally A. Talberg lived in Michigan, Vice-Chair Peter Cramton lived in California and worked for universities in Germany and Maryland, and three board members lived in Toronto, Illinois, and Maine respectively.[57] This revelation drew considerable anger from the public as well as elected representatives, and the board members' names and photographs were temporarily removed from the ERCOT website due to death threats.[58][59] The board was also criticized for its meeting days before the storm: though the meeting lasted more than two hours, the members spent less than a minute discussing storm preparations and readiness.[60][61][62][63] On February 23, ERCOT announced the resignation of the five out-of-state board members effective the end of the board meeting the following day.[64][65][66] In October 2021, El Paso billionaire Paul Foster became the new Chairperson even though El Paso is not part of the Texas power grid. The other open positions were filled afterwards.[67] Foster resigned in June 2024.[68]

Organizational affairs

It has a headquarters in Austin and an additional complex in Taylor.[69]

See also

Related Energy Entities

References

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  69. ^ "Locations". ERCOT. Retrieved 2021-02-21. Austin Campus Executive and Administration Center 7620 Metro Center Drive Austin, Texas 78744 [...] Taylor Campus Operations Center 800 Airport Road Taylor, Texas 76574 [...] Mailing Address 2705 West Lake Drive Taylor, Texas 76574

Further reading

External links